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Abstract 
For decades, maritime disputes in the South China Sea have been focusing 
around the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Due to their unique locations at the center 
of the semi-enclosed sea, coastal states parties to the dispute have exclusively relied 
on territorial sovereignty bases for asserting their entitlements to the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf under the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The 2009 joint submission by 
Malaysia and Vietnam regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles (nm) to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf 
(CLCS) was the first sign of changing opinions by coastal states on the maritime 
delimitation. It brings up important legal questions regarding the feasibility of 
delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200nm generated by the surrounding coasts 
in the presence of the disputed islands. 
By reviewing provisions under Article 76 of UNCLOS, with insights from the 
ongoing proceedings by the Commission, this article argues that current provisions 
under UNCLOS are ineffective in solving the negotiation deadlock between states 
in the delimitation process. The article also points out the need for remedies to 
temporarily delimit the continental shelf in the absence of final and binding limits. 
Finally, the article observes that the entitlements to the continental shelf will play 
more important roles in the legal consideration of maritime disputes in the South 
China Sea.  
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1. Introduction: 
In 1974, the People’s Republic of China (China) clashed with the South Vietnamese 
garrison on the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The engagement ended swiftly with 
China gaining territorial control over the Paracel Islands. A series of small-scale armed 
conflicts soon followed on the Spratly Islands involving China, the Philippines and Vietnam – 
setting them to become the earliest contenders to the South China Sea disputes. As of 2015, 
five states: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have declared territorial 
claims to the two island groups; all of them except Brunei have a military presence on 
certain features.1 The last decade saw heightened tensions between China and other coastal 
states, with a rise in the number of incidents that has put the stability and safety of the 
region at risk. In a sense, the ongoing tensions and disputes between neighboring states in 
the South China Sea have been intensified by the resource-oriented interpretation of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
Coastal states parties to UNCLOS are recognized to establish their rights over the world’s 
oceans under two categories: the entitlement of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) up to 200 
nautical miles (nm), and the entitlement of a continental shelf up to 200nm or to the outer 
edge of the continental margin beyond the 200nm limit.2 The Convention also recognizes 
that islands are entitled to an EEZ, and have the same entitlement to a continental shelf as 
continental coasts. Due to the unique geographic locations of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 
the area that is beyond 200nm of the coasts of neighboring states in the South China Sea is 
within 200nm of the two island groups. Based on this fact, China has laid sovereignty claims 
to both the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands in order to maximize its claim of the sea 
area. On the other hand, Malaysia and Vietnam have indicated their coasts are entitled to a 
continental shelf beyond 200nm and submitted their cases to the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). China and the Philippines have protested against the 
submissions, while Brunei declared its intention to submit a similar claim to the CLCS. 
This situation gives rise to a legal question: In case of the continental shelf beyond 200nm 
exists in the center area of the South China Sea, how effective is the current legal 
framework in helping to establish the outer limits of continental shelf ? This article sets out 
to examine provisions under Article 76 of UNCLOS on the establishment of the continental 
shelf, as well as steps taken by the coastal states in implementing Article 76. In doing so, the 
article finds that the provisions under Article 76 are insufficient to solve the negotiation 
deadlock between parties during the first stage of the proceedings. In addition, legal 
remedies are needed to temporarily delimit the continental shelf beyond 200nm in the South 
China Sea in respect to areas surrounding the two disputed island groups. 
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2. The ongoing South China Sea disputes: 
According to Park (1978, pp. 34-35), following the event of 1974, the interactions between 
China and Vietnam would play the key role in setting the course of the South China Sea 
disputes. Park observed that a legal solution would not be encouraging at the moment, 
largely due to the limitation of international legal practice and unfinished negotiations on 
the Law of the Sea in 1978. In order to end the disputes in their favor, China had to remove 
the Filipinos and Vietnamese from the Spratly Islands, while Vietnam had to remove the 
Chinese and Filipinos from both the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Park 1978, pp. 43-44). 
Hoping to justify the use of force, China had tried to provoke stronger military reaction from 
Vietnam through a series of incidents, which had proved unsuccessful (Valencia 1988, p.440). 
With the establishment of UNCLOS in 1982, the Philippines and Vietnam were given 
options to reconsider their strategies while avoiding confrontations with China. The fait 
accompli posed by Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia in the Spratly Islands had further 
complicated the issue, obstructing the unilateral use of force by the concerned parties 
(Buszynski & Sazlan 2007, p.147).  
Both Hyer (1995) and Tønnesson (2000) pointed out that China would continue to rely 
heavily on its claims of historic waters and title over the South China Sea, as it allows China 
to maximize national interests in the region. Still, this is a very risky interpretation of 
UNCLOS. The geographical characteristics of the Paracel and Spratly Islands pose the 
largest risk of all. Judging from UNCLOS provisions, it is unlikely to draw a single 
legitimate baseline to cover both archipelagoes, and even more unlikely for any of the tiny 
islands in the Spratly area to gain the rights of the continental shelf or EEZ (Tønnesson 
2000, p. 209). This results in China’s vagueness regarding the exact coordinates for 
measuring the baseline, a point well illustrated in the nine-dash line map of the South 
China Sea. The nine-dash line map was known to exist in China’s archives before the 1990s, 
yet China only decided to include the map in its Note Verbale since 2009, citing it has 
indisputable sovereignty over the area but provided no further comments on its effect in 
international law (McDorman 2014, pp. 147-148). Zhiguo and Jia (2013) stated that the 
nine-dash line did not contradict with China’s obligations and rights under UNCLOS. The 
apparent lack of explanation as to the legal basis, the drawing method, and its legal status 
under UNCLOS were the main reasons why legal analysts of the South China Sea disputes 
continue to disregard the validity of the nine-dash line until now. 
On the other hand, the Philippines and Vietnam had decided to promote their approach to 
realize national interests within the confines of the justifiable interpretation of UNCLOS. 
The first significant attempt was the conclusion of a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea (DOC), which was signed by China and ASEAN members in 2002. 
Despite high hopes for setting behaviors and facilitating multilateral negotiations, the DOC 
contained neither specific geographic scope nor binding regulations for involved parties 
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(Buszynski & Sazlan 2007, p. 154). According to Park (1978) and Elferink (2014), even if the 
territorial disputes over the two island groups persist, it is still possible to delimit the seabed 
and continental shelf through multilateral agreements and international law. It is for this 
reason that Malaysia and Vietnam submitted their cases to the CLCS, hoping to facilitate 
new solutions for the ongoing disputes. 
 
 
Map 1: Disputed claims in the South China Sea. 
Source: Author’s creation based on UNCLOS documents. 
 
  
74
3. The establishment of continental shelf under UNCLOS Article 76: 
Article 76(1) deals with the definition of continental shelf for a coastal state. The 
continental shelf, which comprises of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine features, is a 
prolongation of a coastal state’s land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin. 
Alternatively, it can be measured up to 200nm, where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not add up to that distance. Subsequent paragraphs of Article 76 then provide 
detailed criteria for the establishment of the outer edge of the continental margin beyond 
200nm. 
Article 76(4) places the important requirement for a coastal state to determine the foot of 
the continental slope before establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond the 
200nm limit.3 In particular, the paragraph of Article 76(4)(b) specifies that the foot of the 
continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its 
base, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. A coastal state can then determine fixed 
points to define the outer limit of the continental shelf by measuring from the foot of the 
slope. Two methods were given to identify the positions of fixed points. A fixed point is 
established at a distance up to 60nm from point at the foot of the continental slope. If the 
sedimentary rocks of the continental margin have a thickness of at least 1% of the shortest 
distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope, a specific fixed point might be 
placed beyond the 60nm limit.4 In addition, fixed points must meet specific criteria before 
they are used to measure the outer limits of the continental shelf. Fixed points are not 
allowed to exceed 350nm from the baseline where the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured, or 100nm from the 2500-meter isobath.5 They are also not allowed to be more 
than 60nm apart.6 In the South China Sea, it is more logical for coastal states to only have 
the entitlement of the 350nm line. The criteria from paragraph (4) to (6) are expected to 
have little significance in defining the continental shelf outer limits. 
A coastal state intends to establish the outer limit of the continental shelf beyond 200nm, 
in accordance with Article 76, is required to submit its claims with supporting scientific and 
technical data to the CLCS. In any case, the submission should be done within 10 years of 
the entry into force of UNCLOS for that state.7 The 11th Meeting of States Parties to the 
Convention in 2001 decided that states which had become parties to the Convention before 
May 13th 1999 would have their 10-year limit started to run from that date.8 All coastal 
states in the South China Sea had become parties to the Convention during 1990s. Therefore, 
they are automatically enrolled under this provision of Annex II of UNCLOS. Another 
decision reached in the 18th Meeting of Parties to the Convention in 2008 further added the 
possibility for states to submit preliminary documents before their final submissions. 
Regarding the preliminary information, it neither requires a coastal state to give specific 
coordinates of the outer limits of the continental shelf, nor will such data be used against the 
state before the final submission.9 Article 76(8) declares that the Commission would only 
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make recommendations to the final submission by a coastal state. Once established, the 
limits of the continental shelf are final and binding. In case a coastal state disagrees with 
the recommendations of the Commission, it would be allowed to revise the submission within 
a reasonable time.10 
The interpretation of Article 76(8) creates a specific problem. If two or more coastal states 
decide to submit their outer limits to the CLCS, it is crucial to determine whose outer limits 
are to be considered final and binding for the whole area. Two different interpretations were 
proposed at the 2013 Center of International Law (CIL) Roundtable on the South China Sea. 
The first interpretation suggests that the outer limits only have final and binding effects on 
the coastal state making the submission in the first place. The second interpretation 
challenges the former by questioning whether a developing state would spend considerable 
time and effort just for the purpose of binding itself. It should be viewed as an attempt to 
have its outer limits recognized and respected by all members of the Convention. The 
statement made by the chairperson of the Committee on Legal Issues of the Outer 
Continental Shelf also supported this view, pointing out that ‘… only the coastal State is 
competent to establish the outer limit of its continental shelf. It would thus be impossible for 
an outer limit line that is final and binding on the coastal State not to be binding on other 
States or subjected to change’ (Elferink 2014, p.168). 
Article 76(10) safeguards the impartiality of Article 76, stating that the article is without 
prejudice to the delimitation of the continental shelf between states with adjacent or 
opposing coasts – a common feature in the South China Sea. It is implied that the final and 
binding outer limits are not opposable in relation to a neighboring state. Article 9 of 
UNCLOS Annex II also establishes that the actions of the Commission shall not prejudice 
matters related to the delimitation of boundaries between neighboring states. Article 76(10) 
indicates that Article 76 as a whole is without prejudice to the delimitation of boundaries, 
but no specific course of action is prescribed for the coastal state making the submission. In 
contrast, Article 9 of UNCLOS Annex II instructs the Commission to ensure no prejudice 
arises from its actions. This requirement by Article 9 is explained in Rule 46 to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.11 It lays out a specific 
procedure to follow in case of disputes over delimitation of continent shelf or unresolved 
territorial and maritime disputes.12 The procedure allows a coastal state to make a joint 
submission with other states and to limit its submission to a specific area.  Paragraph 5 of 
Annex I clearly states that the submission containing a dispute will only be considered by 
CLCS with the prior consent of all states that are parties to the dispute. An executive 
summary of the submission must be published to notify other states of the submission, 
giving them the opportunity to establish whether there exists a dispute related to the 
submission.13 
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4. The outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the South China Sea: 
In May 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to the CLCS regarding the 
Spratly Islands.14 Vietnam also made a separate submission on the North Area of the 
Paracel Islands. 15  Brunei has submitted preliminary data on the outer limits of its 
continental shelf. China and the Philippines have yet to make any submission regarding 
their outer limits in the South China Sea. China, however, has submitted its outer limits for 
the continental shelf in the East China Sea in 2012. The executive summary specified that 
the submission be without prejudice to any future submission of China in the East China 
 
Map 2: The outer limits of continental shelf submitted by Malaysia and Vietnam. 
Source: Author’s creation based on UNCLOS documents. 
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Sea and other seas.16 The only ‘other sea’ for China to make another submission is the South 
China Sea. In its submission for the Benham Rise area in the Pacific Ocean, the Philippines 
stated that it reserved the rights to make submissions for other areas of continental shelf 
beyond 200nm.17 Similar to China, the Philippines implicitly points to possible submissions 
in the South China Sea. 
The joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam and the single submission by Vietnam 
contained an interesting feature. Both states defined their 200nm outer limits without 
making any reference to the disputed islands in the South China Sea. The defined areas are 
still within 200nm of either island groups. Malaysia and Vietnam, through their submissions, 
seemed to send a message that they considered the disputed islands as having no relevance 
in the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries for them. A different interpretation 
suggests that both coastal states might have wanted to demonstrate that their continental 
shelves rightfully extend into the area, regardless of who is in control of the island groups. 
The two submissions drew immediate attention from China. In its Note Verbale to the CLCS, 
China indicated that the submissions are serious infringements of China’s rights in the 
South China Sea, and requested the Commission not to consider the two submissions.18 The 
Philippines indicated that the joint submission covered areas under dispute in the North 
Borneo region. The Philippines also made a separate claim of existing dispute for Vietnam’s 
single submission, citing overlapping claims of continental shelf. The Philippines then 
requested the Commission not to consider the two submissions until after the disputes had 
been discussed and resolved.19 
China and the Philippines’ Notes Verbales made no comment on the fact that Malaysia 
and Vietnam’s claims are located within 200nm of the two island groups in the South China 
Sea. For the Philippines, it could be interpreted as a lack of interest in arguing over the 
significance of the islands in relation to delimitation and maritime entitlements. For China, 
two elements should be considered. Firstly, China is well known for its main argument 
based on historic waters and title in the South China Sea. If China wishes to persist with 
this argument, then the status of the islands under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS is not an issue. 
Secondly, China has taken the position that its continental shelf beyond 200nm extends into 
the area within the 200nm limit of Japan. If China were to take a different position in the 
South China Sea, it would face the risk of being inconsistent in its legal position. Malaysia 
and Vietnam responded to China and the Philippines’ objections through diplomatic notes 
and in the presentations to the Commission in August 2009.20 The two states held that the 
submissions follow the obligations for states parties to UNCLOS. Both states indicated that 
the disputes mentioned by China and the Philippines had no basis under international law 
to challenge the submissions. Vietnam, in addition, made a comment that it had 
indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Therefore, any territorial 
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dispute claimed by China should not be considered as a dispute under paragraph 5 of the 
Rules of Procedure. 
After the 24th session, the Commission made the decision to ‘…defer further consideration 
of the submission and the Notes Verbales until such time as the submission is next in line 
for consideration as queued in the order to take into consideration any further developments 
that might occur throughout the intervening period during which States may wish to take 
advantage of the avenues available to them’.21 The postponement of a decision until its turn 
is a typical response for submissions containing territorial and/or maritime disputes. As of 
2015, the joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam is ranked 33rd, and the submission by 
Vietnam is ranked 37th on the List of Submissions to the CLCS through the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. Elferink (2014) predicted that the Commission would have to 
consider the question whether or not to establish a sub-commission for the two submissions 
within a few more years. During this period, states parties to the disputes may negotiate to 
get the prior consent from all members. Upon acquiring the prior consent, the Commission 
will be able to give the final decision, in accordance with paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to its 
Rules of Procedure, on the question whether these are disputes related to the submissions. 
Considering the statements given by China and the Philippines, it is unlikely for this turn of 
events to be realized in the near future. In the absence of prior consent, the CLCS will have 
to decide on two matters: whether the dispute is related to the submissions, and whether it 
has jurisdiction to consider those submissions. Article 9 of UNCLOS Annex II again calls for 
a careful approach by the Commission in interpreting the matter. 
From its Notes Verbales, China clearly indicates there exists a dispute related to 
territorial sovereignty over the islands and the status of waters in the South China Sea. The 
Philippines also considers there to exist a dispute concerning the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries regarding Vietnam’s submission and a territorial dispute regarding the joint 
submission by Malaysia and Vietnam. Based on the text of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, 
there is little doubt that the provision is intended to cover the types of dispute mentioned by 
China and the Philippines. The Commission will likely find that there are disputes related to 
the submissions, and subsequently trigger paragraph 5 of the Rules of Procedure. In case 
paragraph 5 is triggered, the Commission will decide to reject further proceeding.22 It is 
possible that the Philippines may decide to change its position on its claims. Subsequently, 
China alone will have to handle two pending legal cases: the East China Sea case versus 
Japan, and the South China Sea case versus Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. 
In such an event, China will need to be particularly careful of its statements submitted to 
the CLCS to prevent any inconsistency. At the moment, the attempt to establish outer limits 
of continental shelf in South China Sea seems to end in a deadlock. 
 
79
5. The need for temporary outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and 
the status of individual islands in the absence of final and binding limits: 
The focus now shifts to what options a coastal state can take in case of a negotiation 
deadlock over existing territorial and/or maritime disputes. Article 279 of Part XV instructs 
states to make efforts in solving any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Convention. If no settlement has been reached after the exhaustion of all options, the 
dispute may be submitted for compulsory dispute settlement methods. Section 3 of Part XV 
places the limitations and exceptions on the applicability for compulsory dispute settlement 
remedies. Unfortunately, matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of 
continental shelf in Article 76 are not covered within Section 3. A submission by either 
Malaysia or Vietnam for compulsory dispute settlement will not pass the preliminary 
proceeding phase, for it does not explicitly refer to ‘disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations’.23 Moreover, 
China has invoked its reservation against procedures provided in Section 2 with respect to 
all categories of dispute listed under Article 298. This means China will be able to challenge 
the competence of many arbitrary mechanisms provided by UNCLOS. 
Without the final and binding limits established through the recommendation of the CLCS, 
under what legal regime should Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam follow? On this matter, 
UNCLOS does not provide a meaningful prescription. Nevertheless, articles under Part VI of 
the Convention may be interpreted as supporting the idea that a coastal state is entitled to 
exercise its rights over the continental shelf beyond 200nm before final and binding limits 
have been established. For instance, Article 77(3) mentions that the rights of a coastal state 
over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation or on any express proclamation. In 
the context of the South China Sea, it means the rights of coastal states in the area do not 
depend solely on the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance 
with Article 76. The role of the Commission is not to pronounce or validate the entitlement 
to the continental shelf beyond 200nm, but rather to determine and supervise whether the 
outer limits have been established in accordance with Article 76. In other words, the 
determination of the outer edge of the continental margin is conducted under the 
assumption of a pre-existing continental shelf entitlement. If the entitlement does not exist 
in the first place, then the Commission has to conclude that it cannot recommend any 
coastal state to establish the outer limits beyond 200nm. Article 76(2) declares that the 
continental shelf of a coastal state shall not extend beyond the limits provided for in 
paragraph 4 to 6: beyond 200nm but not exceeding 350nm at maximum range. By 
supporting paragraph 4, it is again suggesting that a continental shelf entitlement exists up 
to the limits contained in paragraph 4 to 6, even before the coastal state is required to 
establish its outer limits and submit the information to the CLCS. 
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Two matters must be considered if the rights to continental shelf beyond 200nm do not 
depend on Article 76. The first matter is how states may define the temporary outer limits. 
It is suggested that in the absence of final and binding limits, the limits documented in the 
submission by a coastal state to the CLCS could be considered to be the temporary outer 
limits of its continental shelf (Elferink 2014, p.185). The Commission might not adopt these 
limits to be the final and binding limits in accordance with Article 76(8). The second matter 
is whether a coastal state is allowed to exercise its rights over the continental shelf beyond 
200nm without the final and binding limits. Provisions under Part VI of UNCLOS, again, do 
not point to a clear-cut distinction between exercise rights within or beyond 200nm. In case 
of disputes over the exercise of continental shelf rights, it will be up to the concerned states 
to seek suitable solutions for such disputes. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and compulsory settlement 
mechanisms provided by UNCLOS would be competent to deal with questions regarding 
Article 76. 
As pointed out above, Malaysia and Vietnam implied that their outer limits extended close 
within the 200nm area of the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. This fact constitutes an 
important problem to be considered: the relation between the entitlements to the islands up 
to 200nm and the continental shelf entitlement beyond 200nm. ITLOS’s judgment in the 
case of Bangladesh vs. Myanmar regarding the Bay of Bengal might be useful as reference 
points. Bangladesh stated that part of its continental shelf extended well beyond 200nm and 
requested the delimitation for this part in relation to Myanmar’s EEZ. Myanmar objected to 
Bangladesh’s claim, citing such a continental shelf entitlement would infringe the rights of 
Myanmar’s EEZ and its entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200nm limit. The 
Tribunal observed that there was no dispute on the matter of delimiting the EEZ between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar due to the lack of overlapping points. It reminded both states that 
UNCLOS made a clear distinction between the rights of a coastal state over islands and 
water column versus the rights over the seabed and subsoil. Therefore, it was concluded that 
both parties have their rights in respect to the seabed and subsoil delimited through the 
continental shelf boundary, but such delimitation does not infringe upon Myanmar’s rights 
over the water column or its EEZ.24 
Under Article 121(3) of the Convention, maritime features that stay above the water at 
high tide and not under the definition of rocks are considered islands and entitled to have 
EEZs. However, small size maritime features that cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own shall not be considered for the entitlement of EEZ. Few islands 
from both the Paracel and Spratly Islands can fulfill all criteria set out by Article 121, and 
claimants in the territorial disputes have occupied most of them. In the case of an 
overlapping EEZ of an island with the continental shelf beyond 200nm, the coastal state that 
has sovereignty over the concerned island is entitled to exercise its water column right 
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within the 12nm territorial sea of the island. In the case of overlapping continental shelf, a 
different delimitation is required between the mainland coasts and the islands concerned. In 
light of the jurisprudence of ICJ and ITLOS, it is unlikely that individual islands in the 
South China Sea will be considered more important than the EEZs, median lines or 
distances from the coasts during delimitation proceedings. Consequently, individual islands 
in the South China Sea would only be entitled to a 12nm territorial sea at best. 
 
6. Conclusion: 
The existence of a continental shelf beyond 200nm miles from the territorial coasts of 
neighboring states in the South China Sea has important implications for the maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea. In the absence of this continental shelf entitlement, 
international law would recognize the center of the South China Sea as part of the 
continental shelf of the Paracel and Spratly Islands. However, there is in fact a co-existed 
area between the continental shelf beyond 200nm and the 200nm zones of the two island 
groups. This put the provisions of Article 76 of UNCLOS into focus for legal proceedings in 
delimitation of maritime entitlements. 
Through information submitted to the CLCS on the outer limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200nm, Malaysia and Vietnam have promoted an interesting opinion towards the 
disputes in the South China Sea. This new opinion suggested that maritime delimitation of 
the South China Sea might be achievable by focusing on the delimitation of continental shelf. 
It also implied that islands under Malaysian and Vietnamese control in the overlapping area 
have no importance in the delimitation of the continental shelf. If the ICJ, ITLOS and other 
tribunals were to play their parts in the settlement of the disputes involving the islands, it 
would allow Malaysia and Vietnam to gain large shares of the continental shelf at the center 
of the South China Sea. It will be hardly surprising if Brunei and the Philippines decide to 
follow suit in the near future, for their interests lie in the seabed and subsoil of the South 
China Sea, not over the sovereignty of a few islands. It is unclear whether China will 
consider moving towards the same approach for the South China Sea disputes. On one hand, 
by claiming a continental shelf that extends into 200nm of Japan’s continental shelf in the 
East China Sea, China cannot openly reject similar claims by other states in the South 
China Sea. On the other hand, changing from its historic waters and title claim to the new 
approach will greatly diminish China’s maximum range of claim. Still, China would be able 
to claim a substantial part of the continental shelf measuring from the southeast of Hainan 
Island. It is possible to conclude that there will be no decisive change on China’s part in the 
near future. 
Meanwhile, without the prior consent by all concerned states, it is impossible for the 
CLCS to judge the two submissions. This presented significant challenges for coastal states 
in South China Sea to exercise their rights in relation to the seabed and subsoil of disputed 
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areas. UNCLOS does not provide direct answer on the matter, but hints at the possibility to 
draw up temporary outer limits of the continental shelf until the final and binding limits are 
concluded. As states parties to UNCLOS have the primary obligations to submit the 
information on the outer limits of their continental shelf, it helps to bring in a new approach 
for peaceful resolution of the sovereignty disputes. The consideration for the entitlement of 
the continental shelf will continue to play a role in the legal debate of the disputes in the 
South China Sea. 
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Notes 
1 Although Taiwan has occupied a number of features in the Spratly Islands, it will not be 
considered for entitlement of continental shelf in this article. 
2 UNCLOS, Article 76(1). 
3 The continental margin is comprised of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf, the 
slope and the rise as defined by Article 76(3). It does not include the deep ocean floor 
thereof. 
4 UNCLOS, Article 76(4)(a). 
5 UNCLOS, Article 76(5). 
6 UNCLOS, Article 76(7). 
7 UNCLOS, Annex II, Article 4. 
8 SPLOS/72. 2001. 
9 SPLOS/183. 2008. 
10 UNCLOS, Annex II, Article 8. 
11 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS/40/ 
Rev.1 2008) herein after referred to as Rules of Procedure. 
12 Rules of Procedure, Rule 46(1). 
13 Rules of Procedure, Rule 50. 
14 Malaysia and Vietnam. 2009. Joint submission executive summary. 
15 Vietnam. 2009. Partial submission executive summary. 
16 China. 2012. Submission executive summary. 
17 The Philippines. 2009. Partial submission executive summary. 
18 Note Verbale CML/17/2009 reaction to Malaysia, and Note Verbale CML/18/2009 reaction 
to Vietnam. 
19 Note Verbale No 000818 on the joint submission, and Note Verbale No 000819 on the 
North Area submission by Vietnam. 
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20 Note Verbale HA 24/09 reaction of Malaysia to China, Note Verbale HA 43/09 reaction of 
Malaysia to the Philippines, Note Verbale 86/HC-2009 reaction of Vietnam to China, and 
Note Verbale 240/HC-2009 reaction of Vietnam to the Philippines. 
21 See paragraphs 87-92 and paragraphs 102-106 of the Statement by the Chairman of the 
Commission on the progress of work in the Commission at the 24th session (CLCS/64, 
2009). 
22 There is an exception to this pattern, as in the case between Venezuela versus Guyana. 
There is a standing territorial dispute between Guyana and Venezuela; therefore no prior 
consent was given by Venezuela for Guyana’s submission to the CLCS. The Commission, 
however, decided to establish a sub-commission for considering Guyana’s case. See 
paragraph 41 of CLCS/74 of 2012 for the full decision. 
23 Article 298(1)(a)(i). 
24 ITLOS Bangladesh/ Myanmar Judgment 2012, para. 471-476. 
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